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BIOETHICS AND LAW: THE SECOND STAGE:
BALANCING INTELLIGENT CONSENT AND
INDIVIDUAL AUTONOMY. THE MARKS
MEMORIAL LECTURE FOR 1988-89
Judith C. Areen t
In 1758, David Hume pointed to a curious feature of government:
Nothing is more surprising to those, who consider human affairs with
a philosophical eye, than to see the easiness with which the many are
governed by the few; and to observe the implicite submission with
which men resign their own sentiments and passions to those of their
rulers. When we enquire by what means this wonder is brought about,
we shall find, that as Force is always on the side of the governed, the
governors have nothing to support them but opinion. 'Tis therefore,
on opinion only that government is founded; and this maxim extends
to the most despotic and most military governments, as well as to the
most free and most popular.2
The opinions or fictions that sustain governments are not fixed for all time.
When the American colonies were founded, most Englishmen believed that
men were created unequal and that they owed obedience to government be-
cause God had authorized the king to rule. It was as unthinkable in the
sixteenth and early seventeenth century for a subject to challenge the author-
1. Professor of Law and Dean, Georgetown University Law Center. A.B. Cornell University
1966; J.D. Yale Law School 1969. This article is a revised version of the Marks Memorial Lecture
delivered by the author on March 7, 1989.
2. D. HUME, Of the First Principles of Government, in ESSAYS AND TREATISES ON SEVERAL
SUBJECTS (1758), cited in, E. MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE: THE RISE OF POPULAR SOVER-
EIGNTY IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA 13 (1988).
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ity of the king as it would be for an arm or a leg to challenge the head for
control of a person's body.3 By the end of the seventeenth century, however,
the principle that government depends on the consent of the governed was
overtaking belief in the divine right of kings. Its most forceful defender was
John Locke in his Second Treatise on Government.4
The nature and timing of the transition from divine right to popular
sovereignty is a subject that continues to divide historians.5 Lawrence Stone
points to the quiet abandonment by the English state in 1641 of the officially
sanctioned use of torture to extract information from political suspects as
evidence of the widening acceptance of the idea that individuals have certain
rights that a sovereign should not violate.6 Yet as late as July 21, 1683, the
University of Oxford adopted a decree condemning certain "damnable doc-
trines," including the proposition that "all civil authority is derived origi-
nally from the people."'7 In the unanimous view of the faculty and
administration of Oxford, this was one of several doctrines "repugnant to the
Holy Scriptures, . . . destructive of the kingly government, the safety of his
Majesty's person, the public peace, the laws of nature and bonds of human
society."' 8 Nonetheless, by the eighteenth century, the damnable doctrine
was so widely accepted that Hume could simply assume that no one contin-
ued to support the divine right of kings9, and the revolutionaries in America
enshrined the doctrine in the founding documents of our nation.
Americans soon moved on to the more practical problem of how to
make the concept of popular sovereignty work. With the extension of the
franchise in this countryt°, elections became the primary method, albeit an
imperfect one, of determining the will of the people. The declining propor-
3. "The king towards his people is rightly compared to a father of children, and to a head of a
body composed of divers members...." JAMES VI AND I, THE TREW LAW OF FREE MONARCHIES
(1598), reprinted in, DIVINE RIGHT AND DEMOCRACY: AN ANTHOLOGY OF POLITICAL WRITINGS
IN STUART ENGLAND 99 (D. Wootton ed. 1986) [hereinafter DIVINE RIGHT].
4. A critical edition with an introduction and apparatus criticus by Peter Laslett (1967).
5. For example, historians still debate whether Locke was the first to enunciate a true theory
of popular sovereignty. Some have pointed to the Defensor Pacis of Marsilius of Padua, one of the
conciliarist opponents of papal power, as an earlier source, but others argue that Marsilius did not
support true popular sovereignty. See, e.g., Introduction to DIVINE RIGHT, supra note 3, at 50.
Julian Franklin believes no comparable theory can be found prior to George Lawson's Politicla of
1657. J. FRANKLIN, JOHN LOCKE AND THE THEORY OF SOVEREIGNTY (1978). K. Thompson, by
contrast, points to Maximilian Petty, who spoke on behalf of the Levellers during the Putney De-
bates. THE LEVELERS AND THE FRANCHISE, reprinted in, THE INTERREGNUM: THE QUEST FOR
SETTLEMENT 1646-1660 57-78 (G. Aylmer ed. 1972).
6. L. Stone, The Results of the English Revolutions of the Seventeenth Century, in THREE
BRITISH REVOLUTIONS: 1641, 1688, 1776 (J. Pocock ed. 1980).
7. DIVINE RIGHT, supra note 3 at 120.
8. Id.
9. In 1741 Hume wrote "the mere name of king commands little respect; and to talk of a king
as GOD's viceregent upon earth, or to give him any of those magnificent title 5, which formerly
dazzled mankind, would but excite laughter in everyone." Whether the British government inclines
more to Absolute Monarchy, or to a Republic, in ESSAYS AND TREATISES ON SEVERAL SUBJECTS 35
(London, 1758), cited in E. MORGAN, supra note 2 at 151.
10. The early states retained for various durations property qualifications for voters. See F.
McDONALD, NoVuS ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 153
(1985). The extension of the franchise in the United States reflects, therefore, not the original Con-
stitution but the reconstructed version that resulted from the adoption of the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment. See Michelman, Possession vs. Distribution in the Constitutional Idea
of Property, 72 IOWA L. REV. 1319, 1331 (1987).
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tion of the citizenry that bothered to vote in our national elections in the
1980's is one sign of just how imperfect a principle popular sovereignty is.
But the power of the principle should not be discounted simply because it
has not been fully realized. In Professor Morgan's words, popular sover-
eignty is "a goal to be sought, never attainable, always receding, but ap-
proachable and worth approaching.""1 It is an ideal that has captured the
imagination not only of this country, but of growing numbers of peoples
around the globe.
The principle that government rests on the consent of the governed
eventually spread beyond the political arena to alter such private behavior as
the relationship between physician and patient. This Article examines the
successive transformations of the principle of consent as it has developed in
the field of law and bioethics from bare consent to informed consent, and
then, more strikingly, to beyond informed consent. This most recent form of
the principle may prove to be every bit as revolutionary as the idea of popu-
lar sovereignty in 17th century England.
I. THE FIRST STAGE: INFORMED CONSENT
Before this century, the idea of a physician obtaining consent from a
patient was as novel in the practice of medicine as was consent by the gov-
erned in politics in the early seventeenth century.12 In the treatise Decorum
that accompanied the Hippocratic Oath, for example, physicians were ad-
vised to "perform all things calmly and adroitly, concealing most things
from the patient while you are attending him." Further on, physicians were
counseled to treat the patient with solicitude, "revealing nothing of the pa-
tient's present and future condition." 13
Not until the early 1900's, in Mohr v. Williams 14 did American courts
explicitly adopt the principle of lay consent. The opinions suggest that the
developing doctrine of consent in the political realm influenced the courts
when they tackled the relationship of physician and patient.15 In Mohr, for
11. E. MORGAN, supra note 2 at 306.
12. Pernick has pointed to the eighteenth century pronouncements of Benjamin Rush and his
teacher, John Gregory of the University of Edinburgh as evidence of early consent practices.
Pernick, The Patient's Role in Medical Decisionmaking: A Social History of Informed Consent in
Medical Therapy, in President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and
Biomedical and Behavioral Research, 3 MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS 5 (1982). Katz has
persuasively challenged this claim, however, explaining "Like Gregory, though somewhat more in-
sistently, Rush too favored deception whenever enlightenment was not equal to the task of managing
the physician-patient relationship." J. KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT 16
(1984).
13. E. PELLEGRINO, TOWARD AN EXPANDED MEDICAL ETHICS: THE HIPPOCRATIC ETHIC
REVISITED IN CROSS CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES IN MEDICAL ETHICS: READINGS 25, 28 (R. Veatch
ed. 1989).
14. 95 Minn. 261, 104 N.W. 12 (1905), overruled on other grounds Bang v. Charles T. Miller,
251 Minn. 427, 88 N.W.2d 186 (1958) and Genzel v. Halvorson, 248 Minn. 527, 80 N.W.2d 854
(1957).
15. As early as 1767, Slater v. Baker and Stapleton, 2 Wils K.B. 359, 95 Eng. Rep. 860, made
consent to medical care an issue. But Faden and Beauchamp in their path-breaking survey of the
origins of informed consent conclude that Slater had little or no effect on twentieth-century Ameri-
can law. See generally R. FADEN AND T. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED
CONSENT 53-150 (1986).
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example, the court used the term "citizen" to identify the source of a pa-
tient's autonomy:
The free citizen's first and greatest right, which underlies all others-
the right to himself-is the subject of universal acquiesence and this
right necessarily forbids a physician or surgeon, however skillful or
eminent, who has been asked to examine, diagnose, advise and pre-
scribe (which are at least necessary first steps in treatment and care), to
violate without permission the bodily integrity of his patient by a ma-
jor or capital operation, placing him under anaesthetic for that pur-
pose, and operating on him without his consent or knowledge. 16
By 1957, however, mere consent was held to be inadequate by a court in
Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. University Board of Trustees.17 Martin Salgo
was a 55-year-old man who suffered from leg cramps. The physician recom-
mended aortography to see whether he had occlusion of the abdominal
aorta, and Salgo consented to it. When Salgo awoke the morning after the
procedure, he could not move his legs. He claimed that his paralysis, which
proved to be permanent, was caused by negligent performance of the
aortography.18 He also claimed that the physicians had negligently failed to
warn him of the risk of paralysis, and that, if he had been fully informed, he
would not have consented to undergoing the procedure. 19
The opinion of the California District Court of Appeal in Salgo
launched the attack on bare consent with these words: "[a] physician vio-
lates his duty to his patient and subjects himself to liability if he withholds
any facts which are necessary to form the basis of an intelligent consent by
the patient to the proposed treatment. '20 In the court's discussion this more
stringent requirement of "intelligent consent" was also expressed as a re-
quirement of "informed consent."' 2' It was this later formulation that has
since been enthroned in the pantheon of immortal, albeit vague, legal
doctrines.
Jay Katz has traced the origin of the adoption of the principle of in-
formed consent. Ironically, it was submitted to the Salgo court in an amicus
curiae brief prepared on behalf of the American College of Surgeons. Thus
the concept that some physicians consider to be a kind of plague visited on
them by the legal profession was first proposed to the courts by a medical
group.22
The potential implications of the call for "informed" or "intelligent
consent" were and are simply staggering. Franz Ingelfinger, in his classic
essay "Informed (But Uneducated) Consent, '23 first elucidated the difficul-
16. Mohr, 95 Minn. at 268.
17. 154 Cal. App.2d 560, 317 P.2d 170 (1957).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 578, 317 P.2d at 181.
21. Id.
22. J. KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT 60 (1984). According to one of
the brief's authors, Paul Gebbard of Vedder, Price, Kaufmann and Kammholz, a Chicago law firm,
the "broad-brush duty implied by the language of the brief was fully endorsed by the College at the
time," R. FADEN AND T. BEAUCHAMP, supra note 15 at 145 n.37.
23. 287 NEW ENG. J. MED. 465 (1972). Ingelfinger was former editor of the New England
Journal of Medicine.
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ties of achieving intelligent consent:
Chances are remote that a [volunteer in a medical experiment] really
understands what he has consented to-in the sense that the responsi-
ble medical investigator understands the goals, nature, and hazards of
his study .... How can he appreciate the sensation of living for days
with a multi-lumen intestinal tube passing through his mouth and
pharnyx? How can he interpret the information that an intravascular
catheter and radiopaque dye injection have an 0.01 per cent probability
of leading to a dangerous thrombosis or cardiac arrhythmia?" 24
It is not surprising, therefore, that courts began to focus almost exclu-
sively on disclosure of information as the key to judging whether the consent
obtained by a physician was "informed" or "intelligent" and leaving to one
side the much more elusive matter of the patient's actual subjective
understanding.
To underscore the potentially revolutionary nature of the California
court's conclusion that it is not sufficient simply to obtain the consent of a
patient to treatment, but that the consent must be preceded by appropriately
full disclosure, consider what would happen if citizens were required to give
"intelligent" or "informed consent" in elections. It might prove necessary to
provide formal written disclosures of the risks posed by a particular candi-
date, and detailed discussion of alternative candidates and their views, and
then to ask voters to sign a form indicating that they had read the
information.
More than fifty years passed between the adoption of a consent require-
ment in Mohr and the rejection of mere consent in Salgo, the decision that
inaugurated the first stage of the interaction between bioethics and law. In
only seventeen more years, Salgo, itself, was eclipsed by an even more pow-
erful principle: informed consent is also not enough.
II. THE SECOND STAGE: BEYOND INFORMED CONSENT
In 1974, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (since reor-
ganized into the Department of Health and Human Services or "HHS") is-
sued the first comprehensive federal regulations governing research
involving human subjects.25 They marked the beginning of the second stage
of the development of bioethics and law, for the regulations require research-
ers who are working with human subjects to do more than obtain informed
consent.
The heart of the regulations is the establishment of Institutional Review
Boards (IRBs). Each institution that sponsors research funded by HHS is
required to establish its own IRB. Each IRB must have at least five mem-
bers, and the members must represent both genders and more than one pro-
fession. At least one member must be a nonscientist, such as a lawyer,
ethicist, or member of the clergy, and at least one must be affiliated outside
24. Id. at 465-66.
25. 39 Fed. Reg. 18,914 (1974). The regulations have been amended several times since. All
references are to the most current form of the regulations which are set forth in 45 C.F.R. § 46
(1988). The regulations apply only to research funded or conducted by the Department.
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the institution sponsoring the research.26
Each research project that is subject to the regulations must be ap-
proved in advance by the appropriate IRB. In granting approval, an IRB is
required to determine that "informed consent will be sought from each pro-
spective subject or the subject's legally authorized representative. ' 27 The
IRB is required to do more than ensure that informed consent will be ob-
tained, however. First, it must determine that risks to the subjects have been
minimized "by using procedures which are consistent with sound research
design and which do not unnecessarily expose subjects to risk, and (ii) when-
ever appropriate, by using procedures already being performed on the sub-jects for diagnostic or treatment purposes."' 28 Second, the IRB is required to
determine that the risks to the subjects are "reasonable" when considered in
relation to the anticipated benefits to the subjects, if any, and the importance
of the knowledge that may reasonably be expected to result. 29 Thus even if a
researcher is able to find willing subjects who give their informed consent to
participation in research, before the researcher can proceed the IRB is re-
quired to make an independent determination that (i) the research design
has reduced risk to the extent reasonably possible in view of the purpose of
the research, and (ii) that the research is worth the remaining risk it poses to
the subjects.
Unfortunately, there is little systematic information available about
how well the IRBs are performing their duties.30 My experience serving on
the IRBs of a private research university and of a public agency, however, is
that the very process of presenting a protocol for advance review to a com-
mittee assembled for the purpose of avoiding undue risk to the subjects has
done more to raise the consciousness of both researchers and IRB members
about these issues than might be expected from a regulatory process that
vests so much discretion in each local institution.
There is a clear need for a comprehensive review of how IRBs are per-
forming their regulatory duties. There is also a need to develop an on-going
mechanism for IRBs to share their experience. Ideally, a national system
should be established for collecting and reporting significant IRB decisions,
thereby facilitating the development of a kind of common law of IRB deci-
sions. The system should include appropriate incentives for each IRB to
supply its fair share of reports to the common pool. The principle embodied
in the federal regulations that informed consent is not enough soon spread
beyond medical research. There are any number of examples that could be
26. 45 C.F.R. § 46.107.
27. 45 C.F.R. § 46.11 l(a)(4). There are a few narrow exceptions set forth in 45 C.F.R.
§ 46.116(d), but they need not detain us here.
28. 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(a)(1)(i-ii).
29. 45 C.F.R. § 46.11 1(a)(2).
30. The best data available is now quite old. The National Commission for the Protection of
Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research (1974-1978), that was established by Con-
gress to investigate the ethics of research, sponsored a study of IRBs that was conducted by the
Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan. Their findings are discussed in Gray, Cooke,
and Tannenbaum, Research Involving Human Subjects: The Performance of Institutional Review
Boards in Assessing This Empirical Study, 201 SCIENCE 1094 (1978).
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used to illustrate this change. I will focus on two: (1) contracts for surro-
gacy and (2) decisions to withdraw or withhold life-saving treatment.
(a) Contracts for Surrogacy
On February 6, 1985, Mary Beth Whitehead and William Stern entered
into a surrogacy contract in which he agreed to pay her $10,000 after the
birth and delivery to him of a child conceived via artificial insemination us-
ing his sperm. The parties were brought together after both responded to
advertisements placed by the Infertility Center of New York. Baby M was
born March 27, 1986. Mrs. Whitehead realized, almost from the moment of
birth, that she could not bear to part with Baby M. She refused to give the
baby to the Stems and rejected the agreed upon fee. Mr. Stern and his wife
sued in the New Jersey courts for delivery of the child and obtained an ex
parte order requiring Mrs. Whitehead to hand over the baby.31 Mrs. White-
head and her husband fled to Florida with the baby, but were eventually
tracked down. The trial court, after a 32 day trial, held that the surrogacy
contract was valid, gave custody of Baby M to Mr. Stern and his wife, and
terminated Mrs. Whitehead's parental rights.32 Polls at the time indicated
that almost 70% of Americans agreed with the lower court that surrogate
mothers should have to abide by their agreements. 33 After all, a contract is
a contract. Marybeth Whitehead had given her consent, and that consent
should be enforced by the courts.
Mrs. Whitehead appealed to the New Jersey Supreme Court, which on
February 3, 1988, reversed the lower court and held the contract invalid and
unenforceable.34 The higher court declared explicitly that consent was not
enough:
The point is made that Mrs. Whitehead agreed to the surrogacy
arrangement, supposedly fully understanding the consequences....
[W]e suggest that her consent is irrelevant. There are, in a civilized
society, some things that money cannot buy. In America, we decided
long ago that merely because conduct purchased by money was "vol-
untary" did not mean that it was good or beyond regulation and prohi-
bition. Employers can no longer buy labor at the lowest price they can
bargain for, even though that labor is "voluntary," or buy women's
labor for less money than paid to men for the same job, or purchase the
agreement of children to perform oppressive labor, or purchase the
agreement of workers to subject themselves to unsafe or unhealthful
working conditions. There are, in short, values that society deems
more important than granting to wealth whatever it can buy, be it la-
bor, love or life.35
I think the court was right to refuse to recognize the surrogacy con-
31. In re Baby M, 109 N.J. at 416, 537 A.2d at 1237.
32. Id. at 417, 537 A.2d at 1237-38.
33. Sixty-nine percent of the 1,045 adults interviewed by phone said surrogate mothers should
have to abide by the agreements they had signed. Poll Shows Most in U.S. Back Baby M Ruling,
N.Y.Times, Apr. 12, 1987, Sec. 1, at 39, col. 1.
34. In re Baby M, 109 N.J. 396, 537 A.2d 1227 (1988).
35. Id. at 440-41 (citations omitted).
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tract, although not because it is analogous to a contract for child labor or
unsafe working conditions. It is true that moving reproduction out of the
family and into the marketplace may lead to economic exploitation of some
women because women as a group in our country remain economically more
vulnerable than men. In fact, concern with such exploitation led to the con-
demnation of surrogacy by a majority of a committee established to examine
the implications of human assisted reproduction developments, 36 known as
the Warnock Committee.37 The Committee explained: "[e]ven in compel-
ling medical circumstances the danger of exploitation of one human being by
another appears to the majority of us far to outweigh the potential benefits,
in almost every case. That people should treat others as a means to their
own ends, however desirable the consequences, must always be liable to
moral objection."'38
But the argument that women should be denied freedom to contract to
provide surrogacy services is a risky one to advance. It raises the specter of a
return to past centuries when the common law denied married women the
authority to make any contracts. Arguments about economic exploitation
imply that all potential surrogates, individually and collectively, lack the ca-
pacity to pursue their own legitimate objectives through contract, and thus
carry the risk of perpetuating negative stereotypes. A better alternative
would be to prohibit only those surrogacy contracts that are exploitative. A
state might decide, for example, to honor only contracts that paid the surro-
gate at least the minimum wage for her services, whether or not the child
was born alive.
There is a second risk that results from moving procreation from the
family to the marketplace-the risk that surrogacy poses to the most vulner-
able participant in a surrogacy agreement-the anticipated child. The child
conceived in surrogacy who best illustrates my point is not Baby M, but
Christopher Ray Stiver, born six years ago in Michigan with a strep infec-
tion and suffering from microcephaly, a congenital disorder that commonly
is accompanied by mental retardation. When Alexander Malahoff, the sur-
rogate father, ordered the hospital not to treat or care for the child, the
physicians in attendance at the birth were forced to obtain a court order in
order to treat the child's infection. Later, Malahoff denied paternity and
responsibility for the child. Judith Stiver, the surrogate mother, also dis-
claimed any parental responsibility, presumably because she believed she
was simply delivering a product pursuant to a contract.3 9
In 1986, a similar problem arose in the District of Columbia when a 32
year-old woman contracted to become a surrogate mother for her sister.
The surrogate had a history of drug abuse that was not known to her family.
After she was successfully artificially inseminated with her brother-in-law's
36. M. WARNOCK, A QUESTION OF LIFE VI (1985).
37. The Warnock Committee was established in 1982 in the United Kingdom.
38. COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY INTO HUMAN FERTILIZATION AND EMBRYOLOGY, Report 8.17
(1984) [hereinafter cited as WARNOCK REPORT after its chairperson, Dame Mary Warnock, Mis.
tress of Girton College, Cambridge; Senior Research Fellow, St. Hugh's College, Oxford].
39. See Peterson, Legal Snarl Developing Around Case of a Baby Born to Surrogate Mother,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1983, at A10, col.1.
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sperm, she was tested for HIV antibody to detect the presence of the AIDS
virus. The test was positive. The contracting couple was not told. At birth,
the child tested positive for the HIV antibody. Both the surrogate mother
and the contracting couple refused to take custody of the child.4°
I do not mean to suggest that problems never arise when a handicapped
child is born in an intact family. Disappointment and grief can make it diffi-
cult for any parent to respond adequately. Emotional or custodial abandon-
ment, however, is generally not considered an option when a handicapped
infant is born into a family.41 The existence of an intact relationship be-
tween the parents induces both to feel jointly responsible for the future of the
child, and precludes either from feeling that the responsibility belongs to
someone else. But as the two cases just described suggest, surrogacy ar-
rangements increase the risk that biological parents willfeel that it is accept-
able to abandon less-than-perfect infants at least emotionally, and, if
permitted to do so, physically and financially. The surrogate mother will do
so because that is what she is supposed to do; the father and his spouse, if
any, because he is likely to feel that as a purchaser he has the right to reject
"damaged goods." Treating children as commodities, as surrogacy necessar-
ily does, thus poses real risks to the children conceived.
The problem of adults abandoning surrogate children who are less than
"perfect" is not one easily cured by state regulation. Some purposes simply
cannot be legislated, and good parenting is one of them. Even if a legislature
passed a rule, for example, that surrogate fathers must accept and retain
custody of any child delivered pursuant to a surrogacy contract, it is not
clear how the law could be enforced. The law could require the surrogate
father to pay money; but, as every parent knows, paying money is a small
part of the burdens of raising a child. Would the law demand that the father
physically keep a child he clearly does not want? The law does not force
even married, biological parents to do that. If a parent does not want a
child, it is impossible to create a caring family relationship by force of law,
or even a relationship in which the child will be safe from physical or emo-
tional harm.
The arguments against court recognition of surrogacy contracts have
prompted some to conclude that surrogacy should be a criminal offense.
Surrogacy can be done at home, however, without sophisticated medical
technology. Therefore, banning it altogether would require the state to po-
lice intimate conduct in a way that would be unacceptably intrusive.
An intermediate step, which would discourage surrogacy, particularly
when it involves the economic exploitation of poor women, would be to limit
the fees that could be paid to surrogates to reimbursement for medical and
other expenses of pregnancy and to forbid third parties to promote surro-
gacy arrangements for financial gain. The role of the third party in the Baby
M case suggests there is a need to regulate the intermediaries. The Infertility
40. The facts are set forth in a letter from four physicians to the New England Journal of
Medicine. 317 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1351 (1987).
41. The Stiver-Malahoff dispute supports this point. When the Stivers discovered that Mr.
Stiver, and not Alexander Malahoff, was the biological father of the baby, the Stivers assumed re-
sponsibility for the child. Peterson, supra note 39, at A10, col.1.
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Center was warned by its own psychologist that Mrs. Whitehead "exhibited
certain traits that might make surrender of the child difficult," but the
Center proceeded without telling either Mrs. Whitehead or the Sterns of the
risk. Such callousness should be penalized.
Under this approach, private surrogacy arrangements would be permit-
ted subject to the limitation on fees described above. If one of these private
arrangements broke down, however, custody of the child would be de-
cided-as it was in the Baby M case-according to the principles of family
law rather than contract law. In family law, the guiding principle is
designed to protect the most vulnerable party-the child. Custody is de-
cided, therefore, on the basis of what is in the best interests of the child, not
on the basis of who had more bargaining power in the period prior to con-
ception when a contract was drafted, that is not on the basis of contract
alone.
There would be little surrogacy under this approach because few wo-
men would proceed without the lure of large fees, and few couples would
take it upon themselves to find a surrogate without the services of a commer-
cial service. But given the risks surrogacy poses to the most vulnerable-
such as the Michigan baby with microcephaly, the D.C. baby with AIDS, or
any other less than "perfect" baby-discouraging surrogacy seems the best
choice.42
The decision of the Supreme Court of New Jersey in Baby M that in-
formed consent is not enough to justify surrogacy contracts is analogous to
the policy embodied in the federal regulations governing research with
human subjects that informed consent is insufficient. But recent case deci-
sions concerning the withholding and withdrawing of life-saving treatment
demonstrate that the trend toward requiring more than informed consent
will not always be used to protect the interests of vulnerable individuals.
(b) Decisions to Withdraw Life-Saving Treatment
In the past decade, a growing body of legal, medical, and ethical au-
thorities have concluded that the same principle of consent that applies to
ordinary medical treatment should apply when the treatment at issue is nec-
essary to sustain life. Competent, adult patients should have the right to
consent to-or to refuse-life-saving treatment. Opinion polls show that
three of every four American adults agree.43
A majority of states extend this principle of respect for individual deter-
mination to formerly competent patients. Thirty-eight states and the District
of Columbia adopted living will statutes, or natural death acts, that empower
competent adults to prepare written directions for health care to be followed
42. My views on surrogacy have been set out at greater length in Areen, Baby M Reconsidered,
76 GEO. L. J. 1741 (1988). See also M. FIELD, SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD (1988); Allen, Privacy,
Surrogacy, and the Baby M Case, 76 GEO. L. J. 1759 (1988); Jackson, Baby M and the Question of
Parenthood, 76 GEO. L. J. 1811 (1988); Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849
(1987).
43. Two National Polls Show Support for Self-determination, 3 HOSPITAL ETHIcs 1 (1987).
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if they become terminally ill and unable to direct their own care.44 Because
most of the living will statutes do not apply to patients in irreversible comas,
and many impose rigorous procedural hurdles,4 5 the use of durable power of
attorney statutes to designate a proxy for health care decisions has also
grown. 46 In 1988, however, it became evident that assertions claiming a
consensus about termination of life-saving treatment were premature.
In In re O'Connor47, the New York Court of Appeals reviewed a dis-
pute between a hospital and the two daughters of Mary O'Connor, a 77-year
old widow who was a patient in the hospital. As a result of several strokes,
Mary O'Connor became mentally incompetent and unable to ingest food or
water without medical assistance. Prior to becoming incompetent, Mrs.
O'Connor made several statements to the effect that she would not want to
live or to be kept alive by artificial means if she were unable to care for
herself. For example, she told a friend and co-worker whose father was dy-
ing of cancer that she believed in letting nature take its course and not using
artificial means. On another occasion she termed it "monstrous" to keep
people alive by using "machinery, things like that," when they are "not go-
ing to get better."' 48 When she was caring for her dying husband, she told
her daughter that she would not want to go on living if she could not "take
care of herself and make her own decisions."
49
When the hospital sought permission to insert a nasal gastric tube to
provide nutrition and hydration, her daughters refused on the ground that
such a step would be contrary to their mother's wishes. Although the trial
and intermediate appellate courts agreed with the family, the New York
Court of Appeals overturned the lower court decision and granted the re-
quest of the hospital on the ground that there was not "clear and convincing
proof that the patient had made a firm and settled commitment, while com-
petent, to decline this type of medical treatment under circumstances such as
these."'50 The court added: "[t]he ideal situation is one in which the patient's
wishes were expressed in some form of a writing, perhaps a 'living will',
while he or she was still competent. '51 The court concluded:
It is true, of course, that in her present condition she cannot care for
herself or survive without medical assistance and that she has stated
that she never wanted to be a burden and would not want to live, or be
kept alive "artificially" if she could not care for herself. But no one
contends, and it should not be assumed, that she contemplated declin-
ing medical assistance when her prognosis was uncertain. Here both
medical experts agreed that she will never regain sufficient mental abil-
ity to care for herself, but it is not clear from the record that the loss of
44. See generally Areen, The Legal Status of Consent Obtained from Families of Adult Patients
to Withhold or Withdraw Treatment, 258 J.A.M.A. 229 (1987).
45. For example, a requirement that the patient reaffirm a will after being declared terminally
ill by two physicians.
46. These statutes enable a competent adult to designate a proxy decisionmaker who is author-
ized to make health care decisions if the declarant is unable to do so.
47. 72 N.Y.2d 517, 531 N.E.2d 607, 534 N.Y.S.2d 886 (1988).
48. Id. at 526-27, 531 N.E.2d at 611, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 890.
49. Id. at 527, 531 N.E.2d at 611, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 890.
50. Id. at 522, 531 N.E.2d at 608, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 887.
51. Id. at 531, 531 N.E.2d at 613, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 892.
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her gag reflex is permanent and that she will never be able to obtain
food and drink without medical assistance.52
Surely the possibility that Mary O'Connor may recover her gag reflex does
not outweigh the concession that she will never regain sufficient mental abil-
ity to care for herself. Thus the majority admits in this passage that it is
violating the essence of Mrs. O'Connor's expressed wishes. As Judge Simon
noted in his dissent, the majority's test reduces the right of self determina-
tion to a "hollow premise."'53
Judge Simon, also questioned the majority's use of the evidence in the
record. Mrs. O'Connor was undoubtedly aware of the gravity of the prob-
lem she was addressing and the significance of her statements because she
worked in the emergency room and pathology laboratory of a hospital for 20
years "confronting the problems of life and death daily."'54 She suffered
through the long illnesses of her husband, father and two brothers, and had,
herself, been hospitalized for congestive heart failure.55 Judge Simon also
echoed Franz Ingelfinger's concern with the "disparity in knowledge be-
tween lay persons and doctors."'56 He warned that medical personnel will
undoubtedly be reluctant to honor a patient's instructions if they are less
than complete or unclear in any way, and thus the inevitable result of the
court's decision is that courts will be asked to intervene in an increasing
number of cases. "Decisions under such circumstances will necessarily re-
flect the value choice of the judge rather than those of the patient, and are
nothing short of arbitrary intrusions into the personal life of the patient."'57
Thus, the principle of requiring more than informed consent was used in
O'Connor to undercut the self-determination of a patient who no longer
could defend her decision to withdraw treatment or consent to treatment.
III. CONCLUSIONS
This article has traced the transformation of the principle of informed
consent in medical care and research, a principle that mirrors the principle
of popular sovereignty on which this country was founded. Beginning in
1957, courts in this country rejected the principle of mere consent to medical
care in favor of the more rigorous requirement of obtaining informed or in-
telligent consent, a principle that places a burden on health care profession-
als to disclose the "facts which are necessary to form the basis of an
intelligent consent by the patient to proposed treatment." 58
By 1974, even the more rigorous principle of intelligent or informed
52. Id. at 533, 531 N.E.2d at 615, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 894.
53. Id. at 543, 531 N.E.2d at 621, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 900.
54. 72 N.Y.2d at 548, 531 N.E.2d at 624, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 903.
55. Judge Simon concluded:
Notwithstanding this, the majority finds the statements entitled to little weight be-
cause Mrs. O'Connor's exposure was mostly to terminally ill cancer patients, or because
her desire to remain independent and avoid burdening her children constituted little more
than statements of self-pity by an elderly woman. There is no evidence to support those
inferences and no justification for trivializing Mrs. O'Connor's statements. Id. at 548, 531
N.E.2d at 624, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 903.
56. Id. at 551, 531 N.E.2d at 626, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 905.
57. Id. at 551-52, 531 N.E.2d at 626, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 905.
58. Salgo, 154 Cal. App.2d at 568, 317 P.2d at 181.
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consent was increasingly seen to be inadequate. Thus, federal regulations
governing research with human subjects require that, in addition to ob-
taining informed consent from subjects, researchers persuade an institutional
review board that the benefits of the research outweigh its risks. In another
example of the "second stage" of the interaction of law and bioethics, the
Supreme Court of New Jersey in Baby M held that the consent of Mary Beth
Whitehead to turn over the child she conceived pursuant to a surrogacy ar-
rangement was not sufficient to sustain the contract. The court decided that
the risks surrogacy posed not only to Baby M, but also to future surrogate
mothers or children, outweighed its benefits.
The second stage has the potential to bring us closer to the ideal of
decisionmaking by the people embodied in that noble fiction, popular sover-
eignty. But it could also move us toward a society in which individual
choice is ignored in a misguided quest for proof that the individual totally
comprehends all aspects of a particular decision and that there is no possibil-
ity that the person might change his or her mind. That risk became manifest
this past fall, when the New York Court of Appeals authorized a hospital to
insert a nasal gastric tube in Mary O'Connor despite her repeated previous
statements that she did not ever want to be maintained by machines. Such
second-guessing of autonomy has the potential to fatally undermine its exer-
cise. Consider, for example, what might happen if the procedural and sub-
stantive standards imposed by the New York Court of Appeals on Mrs.
O'Connor were invoked in the political realm. Voters might be required to
demonstrate a detailed knowledge of all candidates and issues before they
would be permitted into the voting booth. Surely such a requirement would
do more to undermine popular sovereignty in the long run than to foster it.
Lawmakers and judges who wrestle with the elusive goal of respect for
autonomy in the context of medical care or research need to temper their
zeal for certainty with a realistic sense of human nature. We all understand
that there are times when talking another person into making an agreement
in some way takes advantage of the other. Just as caveat emptor has been
rejected for many important decisions in life, from buying a house to partici-
pation in medical research, contract theories of government need to move
beyond bare consent-to foster informed intelligent choice through educa-
tion of the electorate and disclosure of relevant information. But the goal
must always be to enhance choice, not to discourage it by erecting unduly
onerous procedural barriers. Intelligent consent, like popular sovereignty, is
a "goal to be sought, never attainable, always receding, but approachable
and worth approaching."

